Affirmative Actions by Van Alstyne, William W.
College of William & Mary Law School
William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications Faculty and Deans
2000
Affirmative Actions
William W. Van Alstyne
William & Mary Law School
Copyright c 2000 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs
Repository Citation
Van Alstyne, William W., "Affirmative Actions" (2000). Faculty Publications. Paper 266.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/266
AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS 
Wll.LIAMW. VANALsTYNEt 
Liberals and progressives have been slow to realize that their preferred 
vocab~ lias been hijacked and that when they respond to once-
hallowed phrases they are responding to a ghost now animated by a 
new machme. The pomt is not a small one, for in any debate, especially 
one fought in the arena of p'ublic opinion, the battle is won not by 
knock-down arguments but by the pa;-tY that succeeds in placing its 
own spin on the terms presidllig over the discussion.1 
1. 
The purpose of this brief paper is to unravel several quite 
different understandings of "affirmative action" in our personal 
conduct toward one another, and in our laws. More specifically, the 
purpose is to separate varieties of affirmative actions that do not 
countenance racial stereotyping, labeling and various forms of racial 
discriroination-whetherpersonal or impersonal-from actions and 
programs that routinely engage both of these practices such as they 
are. The first principle of acting affirmatively toward others, as one 
first grasped that principle even as a child, has nearly passed us by. 
In its place, a different usage of acting affirmatively toward 
others-action often described as "race conscious" action (acting "in 
light of each person's race")-has tended to erode, and so to displace 
1perkins Professor of Constitutional Law, Duke University Law School. 
Revised and substantially expanded from an earlier original paper solicited by the 
United States Commission on Civil Rights (WilliAM W. VAN AlsTYNE, 
Affirmative Action and Racial Discrimination Under Law: A Preliminary 
Review, inSELECTEDAFFlRMATIVEACTIONTOPICSat 180 (1985), U.S. Comm'n 
on Civil Rights, I SELECTED AFFIRMATIVE ACTION TOPICS180 (1985)), this 
essay-article is dedicated to Professor Joseph Grano whose friendship and great 
scholarship have enriched my own personal and professional life. The views 
reflected herein are views we have shared. 
1. STANLEY FISH, THE TROUBLE WlTHPRINClPLE 312 (1999). (professor 
Fish, my former colleague, knows well whereof he speaks, indeed, he practices 
what he preaches with unblushing gusto, the better to "preside'" over discussions 
in the arena of public opinion such as he would like them to be conducted on 
just the terms as he suggests.) 
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that principle, to disparage it, even reverse it, effectively to take 
over the usage. Indeed, it has become ordinary to have only this 
latter day usage in mind when speaking of affirmative actions-that 
it is somehow «affirmative action" for institutions and for 
government to install racial classifications, to employ various racial 
classifications to register each of us by race, and to consult that 
registry to measure what each is to receive-to each (if merely in 
some "appropriate" measure) according to race.2 
2. So, for example, "to each according to race" (if merely of course in some 
"appropriate" measure) in employment, pursuant to which notion each job 
applicant is to be identified by race, and each assigned an "eligibility according 
to race," in the award of government contracts, participation in public works 
projects, or even mere on-the-job training for possible advancement in one's 
employable skills. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Weber, 433 U.S. 265 (1979) 
(racial classifications and racial queuing for job training); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 
448 U.S. 265 (1980) (racial classifications for bypassing unfavored firms on public 
works projects); Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469. (1989) (racial 
classifications for awarding city contracts by race); Adarand Constructors, Inc. 
v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (racial classifications for subcontractors as well). 
And so to say, also, not merely "who next (by race) shall be hired," but 
later-when there is a downturn-likewise to declare "who next (by race) shall be 
laid off." (See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Education, 476 U.S. 267 (1986); 
Taxman v. Piscataway School Dist., 91 F.3d 1547 (3rd Cir. 1996), eert. granted, 
521 U.S. 1117, eert. 'dismissed, 522 U.S. 1010 (1997}). 
And so likewise, even in respect to admission to a state university medical 
school or, indeed, even a state university law school, where applicants are 
requested to identify themselves by race, then to be measured for admission by 
race, thus to determine "who shall be admitted" and who-all things considered 
(including their race)-shall not. (See, e.g., Texas v. Hopwood, 78 F .34d 932 (5th 
Cir.), eert. denied, 518 U.S. 1083 (1996) (racial classifications for university 
admission); Regents of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (same); DeFunis 
v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (same); Wessman v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790 (lst 
Cir. 1998) (same, even for public schools); Tuttle v. Arlington County School 
Bd, 195 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999) (same). But we are far from being done with the 
shadow of the new "affIrmative action" state. For so, too, shall citizens be 
identified (from racial census forms and by census tract by race), the better to 
bundle them into racial voting districts, deliberately to concentrate racial 
densities ("to each his own according to race") etched onto "race-conscious" 
segregated gerrymandered maps. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); 
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993). See also Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 
59-67 (1964) (Douglas, J., dissenting).) 
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These newer, explicit race-based ("race-conscious") actions, 
although now quite entrenched, and not currently (i.e., not yet) 
regarded as unconstitutional,3 nonetheless tend to divide nearly 
every Commission on Civil Rights even as they also trouble our 
courts. They do so and they will continue to do so (as they must so 
long as they endure), foundationally, I believe, because of what they 
do to us and what they instruct us likewise to do unto others in 
tum. All presume to label each of us by race, and all presume to fix 
us into racial classes, even as these racial classes may themselves 
shift, change, and mutate, even from place to place and from time 
to time. Categories of racial identity are made to define us, even as 
they at once also presume to inform us how each shall be used, 
treated, and assigned. Institutional and governmental directives 
instruct us to do this same thing to others in tum, i.e., to 
identify them likewise by race and, accordingly, sort and 
classify each-so "affirmatively" to use them by race as well.4 
3. Whether they are regarded as unconstitutional merely shifts with the 
circumstances and shifts also-perhaps most frequently-with who happens to sit 
in authority so to say. See, e.g., the cases cited supra note 2. But see Palmore v. 
Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984) (Burger, C.J.) (emphasis added) ("A core purpose 
of the [Fourteenth Amendment] was to do away with all governmentally 
imposed discrimination based on race") and infra notes 50-53 and accompanying 
text. 
4. As is represented in the many cases collected in note 2 supra. So, for 
example, as noted by JUstice Stevens, dissenting in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 
U.S. 448, 532 (1980), "The 10% set-aside contained in the Public Works 
Employment Act of 1977 (pub. Law No. 95-28, 91 Stat. 116) creates monopoly 
privileges in a $400 million market for a class of investors defmed solely by racial 
characteristics." [d. As Stevens noted, "[ t]he statutory definition of the preferred 
class include[d] 'Negroes, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, and 
Aleuts.'" [d. at 535. Essentially the same facile categories-categories "defined 
solely by r~ial characteristics" -were used still again by Congress in the Surface 
Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 Pub. Law No. 97-424, 96 Stat. 2097 
(1983). The profitability of these highly lucrative racially-defined set asides 
reportedly led to a 25 percent fraud rate in highway contracts in some 
jurisdictions, e.g., New Jersey. (See Johnathan Friendly, Road ContractorsFound 
to beEvadingAnti·BiasLaw, N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1984 at B5.) Anticipating that 
problem and others, Justice Stevens went on to observe (in Fullilove) the way 
these matters will then tend to play themselves out: "If the National 
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Government is to make a serious effort to define racial classes by criteria that can 
be administered objectively [so for example merely to avoid false counting or 
otherwise], it must study precedents such as the First Regulation to the Reichs 
Citizenship Law of November 14, 1935." Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 534 n. 5 
(alteration in original). See also BORIS BlTI'KER, THE CASE FOR BLACK 
REPARATIONS 91-104 (1973) (expressing the same point in more general terms). 
But so, in fact, Justice Steven's prophecy already has come to pass in some 
degree, and so too it has always been and will always be, when "race" is to define 
us, and used also to measure "our" place. So, today, for example, public interest 
has already produced a tide of ink spilled on sports pages and elsewhere in the 
voyeuristic and singular quest to say, "what 'race' is Tiger Woods?" And, indeed, 
who is to say? Whose racial classmcations shall "we" adopt and use against each 
other, as we measure each other by race? 
In one government's view according to its tidy taxonomy of listed races, 
Tiger Woods would be deemed to be of "mixed race." See Hunterv. The Regents 
of The University of California, 971 F. Supp. 1316 (C.D. Cal. 1997), affd, 190 
F.3d 1061 (1999), cm denied, 121 S.Ct. 186 (2000) (sustaining restrictive 
admission quotas of four-year old children by strict racial proportion of urban 
school age population according to race, in state "experimental" elementary 
school, using six racial categories: (1)" African-American;" (2) "Asian-American;" 
(3) "Native American;" (4) "Latino;" (5) "Caucasian;" and (6) "Other (Mixed 
Race).") And so, in the Hunter case, the particular young four-year old girl 
denied admission, was described as "one-quarter Japanese and three-quarters 
Caucasian;" it put her into the school's "category" quota for children neither 
"Asian-American" nor "Caucasian," but of "mixed race, " a category already fIlled, 
and so on that account, she was turned away. 
To be sure, just like that child, to a greater or lesser extent, most of us are 
also "mixed" (the identification of a "pure" race is problematic bordering on the 
fanciful and ludicrous). (See e.g., St. Francis College v. AI Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 
(1987). See also LUIGI LUCA CAVALU-SFORZA, GENES, PEOPLES AND 
LANGUAGES (2000) (noting, among other matters, that Europeans are, in their 
own ancestry, about two-thirds Asian and one-third African, and noting also that 
genetic variations between any two alleged "races" are in fact characteristically 
fewer than within one). (See also Edward Rothstein, "Dismantling Race and 
Unifying the Human Species," N.Y. Times, April 1, 2000, at B9 (reviewing 
Cavalli-Sforza).) 
Yet, though this is plainly so, quite in contrast, for U.S. government census 
purposes, in this year 2000, neither we, nor the child turned away in the Hunter 
case, nor (even) Tiger Woods can be of "mixed" race. Why? Because the 
government's explicit race-labeled categories, as they are expressly labeled for the 
2000 census, provide no such category, and indeed they deny any identity of this 
very widely-shared kind. Nor is it an accident that this is so_ Rather, a proposal 
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to include such a category was put forward and formally rejected in turn (see 
discussion infra this footnote), deliberately to forbid any person from presuming 
to identify himself or herself as of "mixed race." 
On these mandated census forms, moreover, individuals who list themselves 
by checking more than one "race-category" box (so to reflect what they believe 
most accurately reports the fullness of their family history no part of which they 
want to disparage by omission) are not to be counted as of "mixed race" (there 
being no such permitted counting) nor, of course, are they to be counted twice. 
Rather, for counting, their multiple designations are to be ignored and they are 
then at once to be assigned (i.e., "counted") merely to one or another of the 
"minority" boxes (e.g., as just "black"). And just why is that? The objective was 
to keep the largest possible number of persons to be designated among various 
"minority" "races," such as they are defined to be. See Steven A. Holmes, "The 
Politics of Race and the Census," N.Y. Times, Sunday, March 19,2000, § 4 at 3 
(noting how the OMB proposal to include "mixed race" as requested by quite a 
substantial number of people was abandoned and how it was decided "that 
people who list themselves as part white and part minority will be counted as a 
member of that minority group" irrespective of how they think of themselves 
or indeed designate themselves, or want to be considered (not by race at all); 
WARD CONNERLY, CREATING EQUAL: My FIGHT AGAINST RACE 
PREFERENCES 22 (2000) (noting organized insistence that the census forms: (a) 
require one to record one's "race," but also; (b) that there be no box for "mixed 
race," ruling out any such designation from apprehension that too many would 
check it were they given the choice). And for a systematic review of the unstable 
categories of "race" deployed by the U.S. Census for decennial census-gathering 
purposes, from 1790 through 1990, see MARGO J. ANDERSON AND STEPHEN E. 
FEINBERG, WHO COUNTS? -THE POLITICS OF CENsus-TAKING IN 
CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 167-190 (1999) (and see pp. 172-73, noting strenuous 
NAACP opposition to providing any category in the census of 2000 to be 
designated as "multiracial"). 
For an additional and still more comprehensive review, of the shifting, 
strikingly nonuniform categories of "race" currently fashionable with the federal 
government for imputing "race, " aside from mere census boxes, see Richard Ford, 
Administering Identity: The Determination of "Race" in Race-consaous Law, 82 
CAL L. REv. 131 (1994). And then, having done that, for an instructive review 
of things as they also were, when this manner of cataloguing and of treating 
people was similarly fashionable in past state-and national-practice, see Donald 
Braman, Of Race and Immutability, 46 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 13, 1392-1410 (1999), 
a lengthy article collecting the inconsistent, shifting-and shifty-categories of 
"race" formerly deployed by Congress itself, as well as by many states, prior to 
and following, the fateful case of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 538, 549 
(1896). 
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Regimes of racial ordering thus tend to describe the ordinary 
wherever we turn, closing in upon us, whatever our disinclination 
may be ever so to be treated or so to treat others as we are 
PZessy was of course that most noteworthy case sustaining the discretion of 
a state legislature, if it wished, so to classify a given person as "colored" for 
purposes of assigning seats by race, treating with sublime indifference (as the 
Supreme Court held that it could) his uncontested claim that he was "of seven 
eighths Caucasian and one eighth African blood," the Court declaring, however, 
that whether that might be so, it was inconsequential; for once it is conceded that 
a state may make provision to "allocate seats" (sic) by race (as the Court held that 
it was permissible in Plessy, and as states still seek to do today-as in Bakke and 
elsewhere), "the power to [do so] obviously implies the power to determine to which 
race the passenger belongs" for that purpose, exactly as the state presumed so to 
do-and so again, today, "affirmative" action laws, as well as the u.s. census, 
continue to do to each and all of us. 
-And thus, to complete this brief review, so it is even now with each of us, 
even as it is with four.year-old (pre)school children and with Tiger Woods: we 
cannot be either of "mixed race, " nor for that matter merely of "the human race," 
no matter how much we would prefer so to be regarded or want so to regard 
ourselves-"the law" even of the census, like so much else of "the law" (i.e., the 
racial classification laws of the 'affirmative action' state) denies us the option so 
to be registered; it will brook no such evasive answers, even as it brooked none 
in P/essy v. Ferguson, a full century ago. 
What a fine business all this once was-and has become once again-as we 
invite, impose, assign, and create various "tests" and ingenious ways of 
"identifying each by race." And why do we still do this, and not just to "allocate 
seats" as was done inPZessy-and was done again in Bakke-but racially to allocate 
so much else as well, as we still presume to do? Just what is it that one thinks one 
has succeeded in doing when one has at last captured others in one's endlessly-
contrived categories of "race?" (Cj. Toni Morrison, Nobel Laureate in literature 
(CBS television Sixty Minutes interview, March 8, 1998): "When you know 
somebody's race, what do you know? Virtually nothing.") Perhaps, indeed, even 
as Ms. Morrison suggests, one knows very little-virtually nothing at all about 
who that person is or what they are like, their skills, desires, dreams, and hopes. 
Doubtless in all these respects, her point is unassailable. Still, when one's own 
government makes up its categories for identifying its own citizens in this 
fashion, and proceeds from there to allocate opportunities under law in keeping 
with its nice race lists, one knows something, to be sure, though few may feel 
comfortable to have it declared-that one endures in a "racialist state, " i.e., a state 
that regards "race" as a defining characteristic, indeed, a state that malees it so by 
the very actions it takes so to make race a matter that counts however others 
would not have it so. 
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nonetheless directed to do. We are assessed according to "our" race, 
squeezed and boxed, collapsed inside our labeled race categories, 
such as they are made to be. Ambiguous messages are coded into 
our racial categories, and this is the face of the new "affirmative 
action" state. 
Perhaps the mere commonplace nature of this now nearly-
habitual practice of "registering by race" (then to be assigned or not, 
admitted or not, or excluded or measured in some way, if just to 
wait one's tum in some designated racial queue) has dulled an 
original unease-that even as children we did not understand that 
this is how we would be treated, much less did we understand that 
this is how we would be expected to treat all others as well, so to 
register and to be registered by race, and so to be regarded by public 
authorityfromthenon.5 And, to be sure, many who write on these 
matters express no misgivings. Indeed, they seem not merely 
willing to register themselves (and everyone else) by race, rather, 
they express a certain mistrust and skepticism toward those unable 
to share their enthusiasm. Others, not necessarily sharing that 
enthusiasm, may, in any event, see themselves as having been given 
little choice except to participate, so to register and to register 
others by race, and so to collaborate in these race-based actions such 
as they are, whatever their personal misgivings may be. For as they 
are often given to understand matters, if they fail to register by race 
or are unwilling to register and to treat others by race just in the 
manner and degree they are asked or directed to do, they may 
simply be passed over, or passed by, in favor of others of a more 
willing disposition so to register by race and so to treat others in 
5. See, e.g., Tuttlev. Arlington Cty. School Bd., 195 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999) 
(Judge Sam Ervin m noting in the last opinion he wrote just before his death, the 
manner in which public authority expected (indeed required) racial labels be 
ftxed by parents to their own children registering for preschool, in 
contemplation of how they will be assigned: "We fmd it ironic that a Policy that 
seeks to teach young children to view people as individuals rather than members 
of certain racial and ethnic groups classifies those same children as members of 
certain racial and ethnic groups". [d. at 707). See also generally Eisenberg v. 
Montgomery Cty. Pub. Sch., 197F.3d 123 (4th Cir. 1999), een. denied, 120 S.Ct. 
1420 (2000) (same practice). 
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the prescribed manner in which the government wants race to be 
made to count.6 
To be sure, our immediate interest here is ostensibly more 
modest than to revisit matters of this larger sort (though review 
them in some measure we cannot altogether avoid nor should we 
seek to do). Rather, the immediate topic is merely to compare 
different understandings of "affirmative action" in its different 
usages over time. Yet even this much-this "mere" review such as 
it may be, can be useful if just because, indeed, there has been no 
uniform understanding of what it is to act affirmatively toward 
others. Or, rather, it is closer to the record of recent history to say 
that what was once the understanding has been lost, misplaced, in 
large measure turned nearly upside down as we shall see.7 
6. To be sure, however, even as I shall argue briefly hereafter, even if this is 
so, perhaps it is nothing that ought to matter to genuinely affirmative people 
such as they are. Any such person may rather accept the consequences of failing 
to be "suitably race-conscious" if this is what it is to mean: to register themselves 
(and likewise so to register others) by race ("white," "black," "mixed," "Asian," 
"Hispanic," etc., crude cardboard caricatures all), to be filed, measured, so then 
to be "appropriately" treated, assigned by race. Affirmative people will not act 
in that way-the only "race" they will inscribe for themselves is as a member of 
the one they can share-the human race. So, it is in this testing (in how we 
respond to these matters), such as it is, that we may come to know 
ourselves-even as we want also to be known-in the way we pursue our hopes 
and interests in life. (See also N.Y. Times, April 19, 2000, at A27 (review by 
science editor of Popular Science, giving reasons for objections to the "race" 
categories of the census, concluding that "for those who can find no classification 
they like, I invite [them] to join me in considering themselves members of 'some 
other race'-the human race.j; Richard De La Sota Census, L.A. Times, April 
9, 2000, at M4 ("I just completed the 2000 census [asking] if 1 am 
SpanishlHispaniclLatino. **My father was born in Veracruz, Mexico. His father 
was a Basque who emigrated from Bilbao. My mother was born in South Dakota 
whose forbears came to this country in the 1630s and her mother was born in 
this country of recent Dutch immigrants. ***How do 1 answer the 
Spanish/Hispanic/Latino question? Someday, we will look back at these census 
forms in disbelief that the government actually classified people by race".) 
7. Contested usages of "affirmative action" have recently figured 
prominently in efforts to gain control over the description of ballot measures 
meant to bar government from discriminating racially. See, e.g., Lungren v. 
Superior Court, 55 Cal. Rptr.2d 690 (1996) (rejecting an effort to compel change 
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Even this more limited subject, i.e., of the differing 
understandings of the term "affirmative action" as part of our 
modem legal landscape, is itself tangled in spidery subtleties of 
various state and federal statutes. Here, however, I do not think it 
useful to extend this brief paper by duplicating within it the kind 
of particularized statute-by-statute (and program-by-program) 
review others have elsewhere already provided of this heavy and 
technical thicket of law. Here, instead, I mean simply to advance on 
the subject in a more general way, to distinguish actions I think 
once were known to represent "aff"rrmative action" from those that, 
however they now lay claim. by way of pre-emptive entitlement to 
the label, are something very different in kind. We tum to notice 
this drift, then, if just to trace several previous meanings of 
affirmative action, such as they once were (and might still be for all 
of us), and such as they have now pretty much been left behind. 
in ballot-label description of California Proposition 209, to force its description 
as a measure "to prohibit affirmative action," the court agreeing that such a 
revised description would be misleading. See also Blum v. Lanier, 997 S.W.2d259 
(Tex. 1999); the Texas Supreme Court recently reached the same conclusion in 
the course of affirming a state district court decision invalidating referendum 
returns narrowly rejecting a Houston citizen initiative measure modeled on 
Proposition 209 (which passed by a significant majority in California and is 
today fully in effect in that state as is equally the case in Washington as well). 
Over the unavailing objections of the measure's proponents, the city council 
directed that the proposal be described on the ballot as a measure to prohibit 
"affirmative action." The Texas court agreed that this description, prejudicially 
superimposed by the council on suggestion of the (outgoing) mayor, was 
unwarranted and so likely to have confused the voters to a degree affecting the 
outcome [I.e., that but for the question-begging description given the measure it 
might well have passed). (See WARD CONNERLY, CREATING EQUAL: My FIGHT 
AGAINST RACE PREFERENCES 214-217 (2000». As the court quite rightly noted 
in Lungren, and as the Texas courts acknowledged as well, there are varieties of 
affirmative action unaffected by a firm constitutional resolve to stop the state 
from using any person's race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin as a 
measuring rod for determining their rights. A principal object of this revised and 
updated paper is to suggest that, indeed, this is so and that the better forms of 
acting affIrmatively never reduce anyone to some classification they are to be 
made to fit by (a) assigning "their" race, and (b) using "their" race to measure 
"their"rights. 
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II. 
There are, in fact, not less than four distinct usages of 
affirmative action that do not involve any kind of racial 
classifications to which people are assigned and by which they are 
then measured by race. We may understand each-and distinguish 
all of them from current racial registration! racial discrimination 
policies-in the following few steps. 
A. The first and in fact a most obvious way of acting 
affirmatively-the most obvious use of "affirmative" action as an 
original proposition-as one might even now regard it in its 
strongest form, even as one might consider it if just briefly, here, at 
the beginning, is unburdened by technical jargon and nice 
distinctions. Indeed, it has already been suggested in my 
introductory remarks. It is just a normal ordinary way of acting 
toward others, without supposing one "already knows something" 
enabling one to judge them in advance. It is secured easily, indeed, 
it is secured by nothing more (for there is-and need be-nothing 
more) than a personal disposition to think well of people overall, 
and by a straightforward desire to treat all whom one encounters 
in all of life's encounters as their own person utterly free of any 
reductionist stereotype by race. It takes each to be, rather, a whole 
person (even if "merely" a person) one ought not treat in any other 
way-to count or discount by race, to grade or degrade by race, to 
sort through, to arrange, or presume to assign to some "racially 
appropriate" queue. 
Affirmative action of this kind is unqualified, universal, wholly 
affirmative, and unimprisoned by race. It is also a commitment, to 
oneself, as to others, even as it can be also a straightforward 
commanding way of life. And as a way of life, it has its fixed 
principle, fixed in an utterly transparent way. It provides to each 
who subscribes to it a clear and an unencumbered way of living, as 
well as of teaching. It accompanies one through life and frames one 
oflife's categorical imperatives by which one seeks to live out one's 
life as best one can hope to do. It stretches through all that one 
does. It "knows" no stereotype by race. Indeed, it declares that 
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genuinely affirmative people, committed to each other, will hold 
out from any form of racial discrimination, and they will do so 
regardless of how others conduct themselves. And in keeping with 
that commitment, it also necessarily declares that one will neither 
"register" by race, so to imply a willingness to be treated or to treat 
others as different from oneself on that account, nor shall one ever 
solicit others so to do. As we would not want so to be treated, so 
neither shall we treat them. 
B. But acting affirmatively does not stop with this principle. 
There is a well-recognized second-and strongly reinforcing-usage 
of "affirmative action." It exhibits no inconsistency with, nor 
departure from, this first principle such as that first principle is. It 
is action extending to all of the unstinting actions one may take to 
attest to one's commitment to others-that no racial discrimination 
will seep into or be a part of any enterprise or activity that is 
subject to one's power of management or of institutional control. 
These affirmative ("pro-active") measures, as they are meant to be, 
are forthcoming simply the more forcefully to show that one is in 
earnest-and can be seen and known by all to be in earnest-in 
respect to the coIDlilitment one has made. And quite usefully, a 
single concrete example of the use of the term "affirmative action" 
in just this specific sense, moreover, will but handily illustrate how 
the formal phrase used to be well understood even in formal 
government practice for a number of years. The example is 
furnished by the Executive Order, 112468 (an Order applicable to 
federal contractors), issued in the administrations of Presidents 
Kennedy and Johnson in the 'Sixties. In fact, the original executive 
orders used the phrase "affirmative action" solely in this 
complementary way. 
Specifically, in its application to federal contractors, Executive 
Order 11246 required each such contractor first to furnish an 
enforceable assurance (in writing) that the contractor would not 
engage in any racial discrimination, i.e., that each such contractor 
would act in fact to live up to this absolutely clear-and clearly 
8. See Executive Order No. 11126, reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1994). 
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understood policy-regardless of what others (namely, those not 
engaged in federal contract work and thus not subject to the 
executive order) might or might not presume to do or why. Next, 
in keeping with that policy, every such contractor was further 
obliged to take affirmative action (as the words appear in the 
executive order itself), the better to assure that its commitment 
could be relied upon-that there would be no racial discrimination 
in its practices and policies, in meeting the contract specifications, 
such as those specifications might be. Note, accordingly, exactly 
what was the commitment of the contractor in taking affirmative 
action: 
The contractor will take affirmative action to ensure that 
applicants are employed, and that employees are treated 
during employment, without regard to their race, color, 
religion, sex or national origin. 
The requirement is of steps to be taken by way of "affirmative 
action" of what kind? -As the Executive Order specified, namely, 
of a kind to ensure that applicants "are employed, and that 
employees are treated during employment, without regard to their 
race, color, religion, sex or national origin." 
The expected measures were thus to be precautionary and 
preventive measures, i.e., to prevent discrimination to figure in any 
way within the practices or policies of those benefitting from 
federal contract work. These measures were to be taken by and at 
the expense of the contractor from concern that were they not 
taken, some racial discrimination might otherwise occur and yet, 
absent the required "affirmative action" being undertaken by the 
contractor, go undetected and! or uncorrected, as the case might be. 
The expected affirmative action was not to have applicants and 
employees treated differently (i.e., differently by race, by color, by 
religion, or sex or national origin) but the same. And the better to 
assure that they would be treated the same, "affirmative action" was 
expected and required of federal contractors, specifically, to such 
things as the furnishing of special personnel to whom complaints 
of suspected discrimination might be carried, with authority to 
intervene and discipline those involved It similarly extended to an 
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affirmative obligation to provide express notices inclusive of 
information respecting modes of redress individuals are thereby 
advised are available to them, and to a duty to include suitable 
provisions in contracts with subcontractors submitting such 
subcontractors to the same commitments as they themselves agreed 
to honor and to observe. It extended to provisions respecting 
records to be maintained in the employment office and elsewhere, 
available for periodic review to ensure that all applicants are treated 
fairly (that is, without discrimination) to the end of ensuring the 
integrity of business practices from the vices of racial 
discrimination of any kind. 
All of this, such as it was required of federal contractors, one 
may well say was, to be sure, appropriately called "affirmative" 
action. It was affirmative action strictly reinforcing of our original 
definition, moreover, because all of it merely sought the better 
protection of each person from any manifestation of racial 
discrimination that might otherwise occur and yet go ignored-it 
sought to insure that there would be none.9 Thus the commitment 
to this kind of action reinforced a strong, straightforward national 
policy in respect to those who sought contracts underwritten by 
the treasury of the United States. It was action to be undertaken 
9. For confirmation, see also JOHN D. SKRENTNY, THE IRoNIES OF 
AFFIRMATIVE AcnON 7, 134 (1996) ("Executive Order 11246 obligate[d] 
government contractors not to discriminate on the basis of race, color, creed, 
national origin, or sex. ***[T]he contractor was to make a special effort to ignore 
race, and to affirmatively ensure that specific individuals were not harmed by 
their race."); Frank and Joseph Andritzky, Affirmative Action: The Original 
Meaning, 17 LINCOLN L. REv. 249, 255-262 (1987); LYNNE EISAGUIRRE, 
AFFIRMATIVEAcnON 8 (1999) ("The longest standing, federal affirmative action 
program (sic) has its roots in World War II. An executive order barring 
discrimination in the federal government and by war industries was issued by 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1942. ***[p]residentKennedy in 1961 created 
the Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity and issued Executive Order 
10925, which used the term 'affmnative action' to refer to measures designed to 
achieve nondiscrimination. "); FAYE CROSBY AND CHERYL VANDEVEER (eds.) 
SEX, RACE &: MERIT 199 (2000) ("[O]n September 24, 1965, President Johnson 
signed Executive Order 11246, which mandated that all federal contractors take 
actions to make sure that they do not discriminate."). 
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consciously, in brief, to vindicate more effectively, a commitment 
opposed to racial discrimination in government contracting, equally 
in respect to race, as with sex, religion, or national origin.10 
c. Consistent with each of these mutually-reinforcing 
understandings of affirmative action, there is yet a third, quite 
distinguishable, yet itself in no way departing from the strictness of 
nondiscrimination either in principle or in practice. Rather, even 
as suggested by the very apt phrase with which this form of 
affirmative action became positively associated, this extended kind 
of affirmative conscientious action sought the elimination of 
"gratuitous barriers," thoughtlessly maintained practices, 
unexamined "rules" or "standards" that gratuitously foreclose some 
from being considered and treated exactly the same as others and 
always still without distinction, fear, or favor, for being white or 
black, Hispanic, Latino, or Asian, Pacific Islander, Innuit, or Indian 
(or however else the shifting charts of racial classifications would 
seek to identify people and presume to dispense or allocate their 
opportunities and rights). This additional development simply took 
into due account a proposition we each recognize in its general 
form, and ordinarily do respond to when we see it in other people's 
operations, but somehow still manage to lose sight of from time to 
time in the management of our own affairs, such as they are, and 
thus by mere neglect fail to correct. 
So, for example, to illustrate the point at a general level, it is the 
observable tendency of proceeding as we sometimes do from mere 
unexamined habit or custom, to assume the need and continuing 
10. To be sure, even as Skrentny, the Andritszkys, and others were to note, 
this is not the manner in which the Executive Order subsequently came to be 
applied. Over time, even as acknowledged in the very title of Skrenty's book 
(i.e., the "ironies" of affIrmative action), and even as occurred likewise in the 
subverted "interpretations" of Titles VI and vn of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
(see discussion in text accompanying nne 40-47 infra), the phrase, "without regard 
to ..• race" came to be (re)interpreted to mean something very different and 
opposite (namely, instead, "with due regard to •.. race," whatever that might 
mean, but assuredly meaning in practice actively to consider each applicant's 
"race," such as it might be, and actively to make it "count" in determining their 
employment, their conditions of advancement, etc.) 
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relevance of certain things without particularly realizing as we 
might (were the matter given appropriate thought) that these things 
or requirements-as they may be pretty much as we have just taken 
them for granted-may in fact be quite unnecessary in that they 
actually count for very little and indeed may be mere anachronisms 
of unexamined practice in the way we manage our affairs. Even so, 
they are not harmless, rather, they impose considerable hardship 
and real costs on others even if not on us, and quite unnecessarily 
so. They may well, therefore, be appropriately re-examined to 
determine whether they might be abandoned or changed. And so 
one will move and act affirmatively to do, if just to avoid the 
obtuseness of our prior practice and the adverse effects that practice 
has on those whom it tended to shut out. 
Straightforwardly, any process that pursues any such course of 
open review and of revision as this, is itself one that can lay a strong 
and rightful claim to the title of "affirmative action" -action 
undertaken consciously so to reduce gratuitous differential 
treatment of persons not necessary to distinguish in the manner 
one's customary practice did so distinguish them to their 
disadvantage even if just inadvertently, rather than by any 
conscious design. One acts affirmatively by being sensitive to this 
possibility and-by acting affirmatively-one avoids it. There is 
nothing mysterious in how this works.ll 
11. Indeed, the simplest sort of example of this kind of "affirmative action" 
(to eliminate gratuitous barriers) comes not with any special reference to race at 
all, but comes, rather, in the nearly complete elimination of "gratuitous barriers" 
of a literal physical kind-i.e., the elimination of curb barriers affecting sidewalk 
access at ordinary street corners in innumerable cities and towns. "Standard" 
street curb construction used to carry the edge of the ordinary street curb 
continuously around every intersection corner. That manner of constructing 
curbs made passage across intersection difficult for some persons, even while it 
contributed little or nothing essential to public safety or convenience overall. 
Once the matter was noticed, albeit it was very slow in coming, it was pretty 
quickly acknowledged that changing the technique of curb and sidewalk 
construction (merely to provide a smooth gradient entry onto the sidewalks at 
intersections) would cost no more and indeed in some circumstances cost even 
less than the standard design, even as it would greatly facilitate better access for 
persons previously frustrated and put at risk by the older practice. The simple 
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In respect to this form. of affirmative action, one portion of 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 merely picked up on this 
general idea and directed it to employment practices.12 In brief, one 
feature of Title VII imposed an affirmative obligation on affected 
employers to review their employment criteria, to take due care 
that they were suitably job related rather than the mere residue of 
custom or habit-like unnecessary curbs obstructing sidewalk 
access.13 The same obligation of employment practice review 
design change improved ~atters greatly for many. Meantime, neither did the 
changes adversely affect access by existing users in any way. (A simple and 
elegant example of "affirmative action" of this constructive kind at work.) 
12. The pertinent statutory provision is 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2{a){2). See also 
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C. § 623 (a) (I» and § 2000e-2{a){2) are framed 
identically. On the other hand, there is no equivalent provision in any of the 
Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts (42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985), and the 
Supreme Court has declined to interpret them as though there were. These 
statutes, therefore, prohibit only the explicit use of race itself as the 
differentiating criterion or the use of a deliberately selected surrogate criterion. 
See General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375 (1982); 
Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100 (1981). The same observation should also 
apply equally to the Fair Housing Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq), but the 
Supreme Court has not yet addressed the question (see Village of Arlington 
Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Rev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). In the 
meantime, several courts of appeal have presumed to read into that act the same 
"disparate impact" standard as is provided by Title VII. {See Metropolitan Hous. 
Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1293 (7th Cir. 1977), cen. 
denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978). See a/so discussion and numerous cases collected in 
In re Malonee, 592 F. Supp. 1135, 1165-66 (E.D. Mo. 1984).) 
13. For example, at "time 1," it may well be the case that one's performance 
even on a mere "paper and pencil" test is well matched to reflect the kind of skills 
identified to a given line of work or a given course of study. Let it be so. Still, to 
the extent that the nature of the work or course of study may have changed 
considerably since time 1, continued reliance on scores reported from that same 
(unmodified) test as such, may now-at time 2-produce two kinds of errors such 
as they tend to be: (a) it yields a number of "false positives" (i.e., the test will 
overpredict how well those who score well on the exam will succeed on the job 
or in the course of study, when in point of fact they may not); (b) it also yields 
a large number of "false negatives" (i.e., the test will underpredict how others, 
scoring less well on the test, would have performed at least equally well or 
perhaps better than any number of their "higher" scoring counterparts-but were 
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extended likewise to a review of customs of advertising job notices, 
to take care that able people might not be overlooked by the limits 
of one's former and rather narrow recruiting patterns (as, for 
example, relying solely on a union hiring hall for all job referrals 
might tend to do). 
To be sure, the extent to which this kind of affirmative action 
is-or ought to be-required, especially as it has sometimes been 
very aggressively pressed by various federal or state agencies, can 
become a matter of fair debate, uncertainty, or worse One ought 
not gloss over the problem, such as it can readily become and in 
given no opportunity to do so, on account of having already been excluded from 
further consideration (because, of course, they "failed" or did less well on the 
test). Title VII is concerned principally with those within this latter group, and 
no doubt rightly so. Their exclusion was, in a word, "gratuitous." 
But note, of course, the unfairness of continuing to use the test in thus 
excluding the persons in this latter group-"poor" scorers on a test not in fact a 
fair test in respect to their ability to do well in the job or course of study for 
which they apply-is an unfairness to each of them thus excluded (whatever their 
"race"). Title VlI is not, however, much concerned with this, though perhaps it, 
or some more general civil rights law, ought to be. 
Title VII is typically "triggered" once an adversely affected party (or the 
E.E.O.C.) makes aprima facie showing of more-than-trivial disparate impact by 
"race" (or by "sex, religion, or national origin") between the composition of the 
larger group of all who applied for the jobs then available to be filled, and the 
smaller group of those making it past the "cut off" score of the test then in use. 
In general, where the disparity in impact is more than 20%, the employer must 
be ready to make a convincing demonstration "that the challenged practice is 
[both] job related for the position in question and consistent with business 
necessity;" otherwise the employer may not continue its use. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(I). On the other hand, an employer solely concerned with 
avoiding inquiry by the E.E.O.C. may merely want to ensure that the 
proportion of his employees who are, say, "black," is not significantly smaller 
than the proportion of such persons in the original applicant pool. Accordingly, 
if indeed that is his sole concern, rather than undertake any serious review to 
check his "test-score" method of employment, as he should, he may merely take 
steps to make quite sure his work force is racially-composed in a "satisfactory" 
way. To do so, he will pursue a covert practice of racial discrimination against 
"white" applicants, to ensure he has a suitably "balanced" work force. See, e.g., 
Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982) (reviewed and discussed infra, n. 17). 
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some measure no doubt as it already has. The steps one may 
sometimes be pressed to take by certain agencies become ever more 
doubtful as "affirmative action" of this kind at the point it becomes 
doubtful in turn whether the practice a particular agency may press 
to be changed is in fact "gratuitous." Eventually, one cannot avoid 
asking just why a particular kind of change is being pressed as 
vigorously as it seems to be? What in point of fact does the agency 
actually seek-the removal of mere deadwood barriers or, rather, 
something else? If it is "something else," what might that be? 
The easier cases where this form of affirmative action is useful, 
fair and appropriate, may not now be especially numerous. For one 
thing, the demand exerted by Title vn itself has been in existence 
for a substantial period of time, i.e., ever since 1964. And for 
another, then, too, ordinarily (though not alwaysl~ competition 
will exact a proper cost on an employer or an institution inattentive 
to the actual relevance of its employment criteria, as employers 
themselves have considerable reason to know. Today's cases 
consequently tend to raise some substantial questions15 including 
questions about what a given agency's interest truly is and what it 
actually seeks. Indeed, if not restrained by the courts in some fair 
measure, the extent to which a demonstration of "job necessity" 
may be demanded (e.g, by the E.E.O.C. or an equivalent state 
agency) may become but a means of "racial leverage" to move the 
person or firm toward a specific practice of racial discrimination in 
order to forestall the demand itself.16 At that point, however, there 
should be no doubt that such actions-including the agency's own 
14. Thesubjectisusefullyreviewed(amongotherplaces)inJamesHeckman 
andJ. Verkerke, Racial Disparity andEmployment Discrimination: A,~ Economic 
Perspective, 8 Y ALE LAw & PoL'y REv. 276 (with critical comments by Epstein 
et aI. at pp. 299-332) (1990). 
15. Such as how great an expense is it reasonable to incur to change from 
one practice to another when the former practice may, in fact, have been well 
considered and the new one, moreover, may produce but little gain in expanded 
chances for few additional persons even as it may significandy increase real costs? 
16. See Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. FCC, 154 F.3d 494 (D.C. Cir. 
1998); see also Note, Cutting the Gordian Knot of AffirmativeAction, 22 BARv. 
J. LAW & PUB. POL'y 339 (1998). 
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actions-to encourage racially discriminating against some in order 
to generate more facially acceptable numbers of others, themselves 
violate Title VII, certainly as Congress enacted it,17 though perhaps 
17. See text and discussion of Tide vn infra notes 39-42. See also 
Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982). In Teal, the effects of an employer's 
acts of gratuitous discrimination against some persons were sought to be 
"corrected" by the employer by acts of outright discrimination against other 
persons, with the employer ultimately attempting to defend on the grounds that 
the net effect was a wash, i.e., that the overall resulting work force was of 
approximately the same racial mix as it would have been in the absence of any 
discrimination of either kind. Id. at 454-455. This was known as "the bottom 
line" defense. (It acquired this description on the notion that "the bottom line" 
was that the work force thus worked out racially overall much the same as it 
would have been had there been no discrimination at all.) The Supreme Court 
rejected the defense (id. at 457) and rightly so. The Teal case is, or should be, of 
pivotal importance for among other things, it firmly rejects the view that an 
individual's personal opportunities may be measured by race, and that an 
individual may be discriminated against because of his or her race so long as that 
person's racial group has been granted its fair share as a racial group. (See id. 
generally; see also e.g., Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 
(1984); Arizona Governing Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073 (1984); Los Angeles 
Dep't of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978». 
The theory that the right of the individual may appropriately be measured 
by race, so that (for instance) whether one is racially ineligible-or less 
eligible-for employment because "his" or "her" (racial) group already has crits" 
share, or is already "adequately represented," with each race's quota to be 
measured by the racial fraction of an employer's applicant pool, or racial fraction 
of customers (as the NAACP now sometimes evidendythinks is appropriate, see 
infra, this note) was thus rejected by the Court in Teal. Teal, 457 U.S. at 457. 
Nor was this new. It had likewise been rejected by the Supreme Court many 
decades earlier, on the grounds that it was utterly inconsistent with the 
Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 468 
(1950) (unanimously affirming a State court injunction forbidding racial 
picketing to coerce race quota hiring based on racial customer "shares") ("If 
petitioners were upheld in their demand then other races, white, yellow, brown 
and red, would have an equal right to demand discriminatory hiring on a racial 
basis. See ide at 363-364. [But] it was just such a situation-an arbitrary 
discrimination upon the basis of race and color alone, rather than a choice based 
solely on individual qualification for work to be done-which the court con-
demned in the first place. See id.") Even so, however, the NAACP has resumed 
efforts to induce boycotts of enterprises in order to compel their agreement for 
racial hiring in proportion to racial customer shares (although it does not suggest 
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not as some would now like it understood. 
But putting to one side this ill-conceived misapplication of 
particular federal or state statutes as may be reflected in certain de 
facto employer and agency practices, there is otherwise nothing 
objectionable to this form of affirmative action and, indeed, there 
is much to commend it, whether required by laws or not. The 
elimination of gratuitous barriers to equal opportunity per se 
disadvantages no one by race. It is conscious of those whom it will 
benefit (namely, many formerly left out and by no means just those 
of merely some particular race) but conscientious, too, of those 
with whom they are then treated identically, neither better nor 
worse-without indexing or allocating by quotas, targets, goals, or 
other stratagems of race. 
D. There is yet a fourth form of "affirmative" action. It is quite 
different in one significant respect from what we have reviewed 
and, as we shall see, potentially subject to some consequences and 
effects not present in the forms of affirmative action thus far 
reviewed. It also departs substantially from these other forms in a 
very major respect. This form of affirmative action (if it may 
rightly be so described) differs because it operates very much with 
"race in mind," albeit it does so only at a political level of social 
choice, and not in any other way. It is any action that establishes a 
higher priority for a particular program or undertaking partly, 
perhaps even largely or primarily, in anticipation of those expected 
to benefit "by race," and to do so even disproportionately by race. 
It may even presume to make a particular program a "preferred" 
program quite expressly on that very account. 
In brief, this is action of a kind that declares the comparative 
worth of one program to be "more urgent" or "more appropriate" 
than another program because of some comparatively greater racial 
group advantage it will presumably provide. Yet, depending on how 
such racially-driven choices are carried into effect (i.e., by whom, 
that such a business practice is appropriate where, under standards of merit and 
nondiscrimination, African Americans are already employed disproportionately 
to expenditures by black customers alone (e.g., the NBA). (See Iver Peterson, 
Making Big Business a Threat!t Can'tRefose, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 2,1984, at lOE.) 
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and why, and in whose behalf), proceeding in this fashion is 
nonetheless called "affirmative action," even as a single example 
may be helpful to illustrate the general idea, and how its reasoning 
runs. 
So, suppose a municipality may have sufficient funds on hand 
within its current budget giving it a choice between approving a 
proposal to allocate a million dollars for downtown street 
improvements or for the improvement of the public library, but 
not both. And suppose also that it may be obvious in a given 
circumstance, moreover, that given the location of the library (i.e., 
where it is situated, who lives nearby, patterns of existing use, etc.) 
it is very likely that a larger proportion as well as a larger number 
of the community'S "black" population than of its "white" 
population may take advantage of the improved library, if that is 
how the money is spent, rather than spent on downtown street 
improvements as others propose. 
The decision to fund the library improvements may be 
preferred to the decision to spruce up the downtown area. It may 
even be thought to constitute the "better" choice, moreover, partly 
"because of the likely racial characteristics of many and, indeed, 
perhaps most or nearly all of those who will derive the greater 
benefit. If so, it is thus, in fact, at least partly a "racially driven 
choice." Even so, it may still be regarded as a kind of "affirmative 
action," nonetheless, for although it is done to advance the quality 
of life principally for "black" residents (because they are expected 
to be its principal users and because the decision was made in 
anticipation of that fact) it also stops right there in its use of race. 
That is, under no circumstances would any further use of race be 
involved, any more than would have been the case had the funds 
been spent instead for street improvements, as others had urged be 
done.18 
This kind of affirmative action is nonetheless highly sensitive on 
18. Under no circumstances, for instance, would one also issue "black" and 
"white" library cards, reserving books by race, or allocating enrollment in 
reading classes by racial share (such that one becomes "ineligible by race" or "less 
eligible" if one's racial share has already been "subscribed") or the like. 
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merit, however, for reasons we shall shortly note, despite what 
might appear to be the modest and seemingly wholly benign and 
even uncontroversial example we have just sought to provide. In its 
favor, there are these two obvious and strong features: (a) it is well 
designed to be of significant benefit to ethnic minority families 
(indeed, by design, to be of "disproportionate" benefit to them), 
even as many will desire and consider it entirely appropriate to do; 
and (b) it nonetheless does not involve any racial discrimination in 
its operations, so it avoids the odium of any racial 
discrimination-the books and the reading program are made a part 
of the public library which does not measure anyone's eligibility 
for any of its services, in any degree, by race. Rather, it-the 
library-operates as always, with no race cards, no race quotas, no 
race preferences, in queuing, in assistance, in service, of any kind. 
A particular compassion for the comparatively greater benefit to 
ethnic minority families may have significantly (or even critically) 
determined the programmatic choice, vis-a-vis the downtown street 
improvement program, but the choice is made consistent with a 
firm resolve that there is to be no racial discrimination tolerated in 
the operations or programs of the public library thus enhanced and 
supported by taxes contributed by all.19 
19. Cj. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); United Steelworkers v. 
Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979); Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 
U.S. 265 (1978). (None of the practices in these cases respected this principle but 
rather, all involved using an individual's "race" personally to determine their 
rights of admission or of exclusion as such.) In contrast, the assurance that 
whatever one's "race," academic achievement in one's high school in the upper 
10% (whether that high school be urban or rural, and whether predominantly 
white or black or brown or of infinite various mixtures and shades in between) 
will enable one to attend the state university, not excluding even its most 
rigorous branch, meets this standard. It may well be within a legislature'S 
discretion so to provide as a generous resolve to encourage all, whatever their 
race, to do well in what they are given to do. See, e.g., J od. Wilgeren, New Law 
In Texas Preserves Racial Mix in State Colleges, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 24, 1999, at A1 
{reporting that this mode of providing admission eligibility to the University of 
Texas, clearly beneficial to a substantial number of previously-ineligible white 
students (i.e., those graduating in the upper 10% of their high school though not 
faring necessarily as well on standard national college admission tests) as well as 
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Despite these strong (and genuinely compelling) features, 
however, this form of affirmative action may nevertheless raise 
troubling questions. Not all such questions, moreover, are easily 
laid aside. The beginnings of that difficulty can be seen merely in 
considering particular variations on the example already provided. 
Perhaps we can start with an obvious example of the following 
("reverse") sort. 
In the case we have just supposed, we noted in passing that the 
competing priority choice for the million dollar expenditure was 
for downtown street improvements. And perhaps, such an 
expenditure might have been seen as more beneficial to "white" 
residents overall than to "black" residents overall, i.e., even 
"disproportionately" beneficial to them.20 
Yet, here, now that we consider the matter, even as a matter of 
ordinary political scruples, surely this mirror~image scenario should 
give us pause were that prospect itself to become the very basis on 
which the majority of the city council resolved its spending-priority 
choice. And of course it almost surely will. Moreover, actually, 
even as a matter of virtually settled constitutional law , if it could be 
shown that the street improvement plan was approved "in order to" 
carry out a general disposition to make only such expenditures as 
may benefit whites disproportionately and if it could be shown that 
the library expenditure would have been approved instead "but for" 
the city council's preference solely for white-favoring expenditures, 
a federal court injunction may be secured against this race-driven 
preference, such as it is. And rightly so, as I do not doubt most 
would readily agree. Where such a "rac~favoring" effect is not 
at least as many previously-ineligible "African-American" and "Hispanic" 
students, secured much greater public overall than when applicants were 
admitted or refused by race). 
20. It might have been seen as such, for instance, if the majority of business 
establishments likely to benefit from the proposed street improvements were 
white-ovrned establishments. Similarly, if disproportionately more whites than 
blacks tended to frequent the city's business center (rather than frequent the 
library), spending for such street improvements as make their activities easier 
might well have been seen for that reason as the better choice than to spend the 
same sum on library improvements unlikely to benefit whites so favorably. 
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simply a consequence of the action, but is rather the very reason 
why this action was taken (and also why alternative proposals that 
might have been accepted were instead rejected), it may very well 
and properly be enjoined under 42 U.S.C. §1983.21 Moreover, 
we may duly note that this is the correct result even assuming that, 
of course, there is still no discrimination in the execution or in the 
operation of the street improvement plan, i.e., that of course all 
black and white persons are equally welcome to take advantage of 
the better streets and none will be made to stand aside, shop later, 
or park less conveniently, by any kind of racial preference or test. 
The taint-such as it is-lies underneath, in the racially partisan, 
racially driven, motivation of the city council's social preference 
plus the sought after (racially) disparate impact of its action. Its 
deeper vice is that it embraces a view of the political process that 
the Fourteenth Amendment does not accept, a view that political 
control properly entitles one to use that control as a racial spoils 
system. The Fourteenth Amendment meant to drive out, rather 
than to entrench, such uses of public and of governmental power. 
And so, presumably, the same conclusion would follow equally 
if a library expenditure were favored over downtown street 
improvements, assuming the decision were nonetheless made on the 
same improper basis-that the location of the library indicates 
predominantly white library traffic so that white interests will be 
preferred over street improvements less helpful to whites albeit 
more helpful to others by far. As much as this is dictated by mere 
consistency in the constraint we believe the Fourteenth 
Amendment itself properly suggests. 
But if all of this is correct (as it is), however, then the original 
case also surely raises-or assuredly may raise-some reasonably 
serious questions on its own account as well, despite the first 
21. See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985); Rogers v. Lodge, 458 
U.S. 613 (1982); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 
252 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1979). See also Gomillion v. 
Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); compare Personnel Administratorv. Feeney, 442 
U.S. 256 (1979). 
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impression that it is so clearly distinguishable as many will insist 
that it plainly is. Is it? How so? To what extent? The implicit 
assumption in affirmative action of this sort is that it is merely 
appropriate for government to acknowledge the "special circum-
stances" of ethnic minorities, at least in its selection of social 
priorities and programs and expenditures. Thus, the observation 
will be offered, at least insofar as the programs themselves involve 
no racial discrimination in their administration, a compassionate 
resolve to grant priority to such expenditures precisely because they 
will be of disproportionate assistance to ethnic minority groups 
must surely be an acceptable form of affirmative action. Or so it 
will be argued, indeed, has been argued strongly and at considerable 
length.22 
There is, nonetheless, a considerable naivete entertained within 
this view, despite its provisional attractiveness as it would seem to 
be. For one thing, it assumes that the determination of social 
preference even expressly resolved on racial grounds, at least so 
22. See, e.g., Boris 1. Bittker, THE CASE FOR BLACK. REPARATIONS (1973). 
Many commentators go much further, to be sure, urging that "corrective justice" 
legitimizes specific overt racial discrimination forms of "affirmative action" as 
well (mdexing persons by race, so to disprefer all those, i.e., "whites," to whom 
some measure of unjust advantage is assigned. See, e.g., Derrick Bell, AND WE 
ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (1987); Girardeau 
Spann, RACE AGAINST THE SUPREME COURT (1993) (passim and see also various 
authors cited at p. 222, n. 113); J. Clay Smith, Jr. Open Letter to The President on 
Race and Affirmative Action, 42 How. L.J. 27 (1998); Richard Delgado, Hugo 
Black Lecture: Ten Arguments Against Affirmative Action-How Valid?, 50 ALA. 
L. REv. 135, 151, 152 (1998) (opposing programs qualifying beneficiaries by 
nonracial standards of "socioeconomic status," rather than (also) by race, if just 
because "the number of poor whites greatly exceeds that of poor blacks and 
browns" whom Delgado insists are more deserving or even entitled as such 
(whether or not poor or relatively well-to-do) on a "restitutive or reparational 
rationale;" and likewise opposing programs merely seeking a broader range of 
"intellectual or ideological diversity" as such, for that, too, he complains, would 
substitute a criterion other than race per se and, if neutrally applied, fail to favor 
"blacks and browns" in the manner and degree Delgado-and others-deem it a 
high obligation on government to do.) See also BRYANFAIR, NOTES OF A RACIAL 
CASTE BABY (1997». (Compare essays and discussion, in STEVEN CAHN (ed.), 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DEBATE (1995).) 
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long as it is "racially minority" favoring, rather than "racially 
majority" favoring, will be ameliorative and healing. Perhaps, 
though that may require some refinement (and assumptions) in 
seeing just who is who (e.g., who counts as part of some "racial 
minority" and who does not), and just why things are judged this 
way. It may also assume (and most probably does assume) that the 
vast majority of uses to be made of such affirmative action will tend 
principally to benefit underprivileged persons in general,23 
moreover, and not merely certain politically favored, racially-
dominate segments within a given community such as it may be. 
Perhaps, but there is even less reason for confidence in this 
assumption, such as it tends to be. Indeed, in point of fact it is 
unclear that either of these outcomes will typically characterize 
these actions, nor can we long deceive ourselves into thinking these 
sorts of decisions are somehow capable of being made right or 
lawful only when undertaken "unselfishly" {i.e., only when 
undertaken by allegedly benign majorities attempting thus to offset 
such abuses of power as may have occurred in the past2~. The 
obvious problem is that there is nothing inherent in the mechanism 
we have been reviewing to keep it harmless from extremely selfish 
and altogether racially-organized capture and racially-organized use. 
To the contrary, it invites precisely that consequence in real life. 
Perhaps to see this point more clearly, start, again, with this. As 
an original proposition, what we affirm here as a general 
proposition can scarcely be denied as an equally appropriate 
23. (-Which is a substantial feature of the Texas plan (discussed in note 19 
supra), however, and thus a feature very likely to secure its constitutional 
integrity; even as the N.Y. Times reported it also does produce within the 
entering class of the University of Texas a genuine presence of African-American 
and of Hispanic students virtually as numerous as when the state university used 
race as a "jump-ahead" ticket of admission as it previously did but was enjoined 
from continuing to do.) (See also the careful, elaborate review by Kim Forde-
Mazrui, The Constitutional Implications of Race·Neutral Affirmative Action, 88 
GEORGETOWN L.J. 2331 (2000)). 
24. Cf.JOHNHARTELY,DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 170-171 (1980};John 
Hart Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. em. L. 
REv. 723 (1974). 
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measure for a city council to take, though taken, for example, the 
very first moment new "black" majorities (and! or other seH-
servingly-oriented ethnic coalitions) suddenly capture urban 
government and at once resolve to vote for nothing not 
emphatically conducive solely to their own racially targeted seH-
interests. Yet, it is obviously doubtful whether such varieties of 
racial spoils (for such they are) are rightly described as "affirmative" 
action at all. Moreover, it is surely odd, on the face of things, is it 
not, to hold that the Fourteenth Amendment will forbid 
controlling "white" majorities to enact only disproportionately 
white-favoring regulations or expenditures, but to see no equivalent 
constitutional wrong in permitting or even encouraging precisely 
such racialist preferences in the exercise of power by others. Nor, 
moreover, is it likely to be conducive to ameliorative (rather than 
racially polarized) politics at all.25 
Whatever its putative virtues, then, what we have been 
discus~ing is probably not a proposal that is, in fact, a characterizing 
feature of an affirmative, mature and compassionate community 
overall. That such communities ("affirmative, mature, and 
compassionate") should be attentive to the less fortunate in ways 
cutting across race, and that they should act affirmatively in 
selecting among priorities those particularly helpful to 
disadvantaged neighborhoods or families as such, is entirely 
unobjectionable. But that they should not proceed in this inclusive 
way but instead sedulously cultivate the different question (who 
will racially benefit, "us" or "them") is not the same.26 The 
25. Cf. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. 
L. REv. 1060, 1102-1107 (1991). 
26. But see references in note 22, supra, to sources and authors who would 
presumably maintain there is nothing inappropriate insofar as (racial) "minority" 
groups may become a majority and at once vote their collective (racial-coalition 
based) racial self-interest as such (for in the view of these authors such racial self-
favoring would presumably merely carry through just claims by way of 
reparations and! or restitution (from "white" persons) which ought to be their 
due in any event; thus that they follow that ideology once takingpower, is merely to 
secure what was their due). Thus are matters reasoned in some circles, as a way of 
"getting beyond race." 
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reintroduction of fears and of anxieties, so to think in terms of "us" 
(racially) and of "them" (racially) is altogether predictable, empty, 
barren, and sterile. It ought not be a part of our destiny. It ought 
not characterize the way we think of one another, or treat one 
another, at al1.27 
Even so, it will be said that the realpolitik of American life may, 
in fact, nurture these realities-these "systems" such as they are and 
tend to be-and probably neither courts, nor constitutions, nor 
legislation can practically preclude them altogether,28 nor 
necessarily should courts attempt so to do though checking the 
practice at least when it has degraded to the level of an incorrigible 
regular habit or pattern, marking a "racial spoils system" mind-set 
of some state or local government, seems well within the 
competence and constitutional capacity of state and federal courts. 
And for those who disagree (and so would grant freer rein for racial 
politics to play out in the fields of organizing politically by race the 
better to advance racial group interests, and thus to play "capture 
the flag" so then to say what shall and shall not be funded, where 
facilities shall be located, etc.), still it is a restraining feature of even 
this version of government discretion, at whatever level it may tend 
to operate, it operates consistent with recognizing that whatever the 
program, project, or undertaking thus undertaken by the 
government, there is, of course, to be no discrimination in its 
administration. No individual, no person, is to be "measured for 
eligibility by race." No one is issued their racial identity card and told 
what shall be their racial queue, their quota, their share, their eligibility 
by race.29 Wherever the library is to be built, or however few or 
many the books in the library, or the scarcity or surplus of 
openings in its reading program, that is never how they are 
rationed. These things are seen to be what they are-utterly 
27. Cj Kathleen Sullivan, After Affirmative Action, 19 OHIO ST. L.J. 1039, 
1044-1053 (1998); Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427 (1997}. 
28. For a thoughtful review of the difficulties, see, e.g., the opinion of Justice 
Stevens in Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 631 (1982). 
29. Compare the statutes and practices which do not keep faith with this 
minimum assurance, e.g, in the cases cited supra, note 2. 
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demoralizing forms of racial ordering and (in my view) manifest 
evidence that the people who endure such a system have resigned 
themselves to the methods of indexing common to quintessentially 
racialist states. 
ill. 
Even so, this different phenomenon now commonplace for 
various levels of government and institutional centers of power to 
pursue is also now called affirmative action. Whatever it is called, 30 
however, it is also marked off by a deliberate practice of 
personalized-and impersonalized-racial "sorting" and, pursuant 
thereto, by varieties of express racial discrimination as well. So, 
characteristic of all such regimes, again, it begins first by indexing 
individuals by race (always this is the first indispensable step-it 
must be done and it marks the regime); and it measures out to each 
their place or civil rights in whole or in part according to that racial 
index, putting some ahead (or behind), or in (or out) by race. It is 
this action of government and! or of institutional and private 
practice of encouraging (even requiring) each person to be identified 
racially, precisely for the purpose of distinguishing that person's 
30. Cj. Wessman v. Gittens (1st Cir., No. 98-1657, Nov. 19, 1998) at p. 4 
("Attractive labeling cannot alter the fact that any program which induces 
schools to grant preferences based on race and ethnicity is constitutionally 
suspect.") (Granting "preferences" by race is itself but an obvious example of a 
particular kind of racial discrimination (namely, a kind some strive endlessly to 
defend), as in presuming to take pride in the extent to which one's "preference" 
for a poor white orphan over an equally poor black orphan-or the 
opposite-advances the education of the one whose "progress," given the 
preference, is then cited as the obvious good produced by the plan, while 
conveniently blanking from one's mind the means by which it was done. (It is 
this ability to "blank from one's mind" that sustains the hubris of what one has 
presumed to do.) See, e.g., WIllIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BoK, THE SHAPE OF 
THERIvER (1998). Butseealso JOHNH. MCWHORTER, LOSING THE RACE: SELF-
SABOTAGE IN BLACK AMERICA (2000); STEPHAN THERNSTROM & ABIGAIL 
THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN BLACK AND WHITE: ONE NATION, INDMSmLE 
(1997); Stephan Thernstrom & Abigail Themstrom, Reflections on The Shape of 
TheRiver, 46 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1582 (1999).) 
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civil rights from those of others "different" from oneself by 
race-sometimes for one's advantage, sometimes not, but in no 
instance not to have race matter and in no instance not to have race 
count. It is where we tend to find ourselves even now. 
The racial distinction sought to be attached to each of us may 
be used (even as it still appears to be thus used) to say whom one 
may lawfully adopt,31 just as it was formerly used to say whom one 
may marry or not.32 The distinction may be made, still by race, 
even in respect to the very school to which one is assigned,33 yet 
even more, even to determine whether one may be admittedatall.34 
It may well be used, indeed, is and has been used, in the 
determination of mere job-training eligibility-an eligibility 
"measured by race. "35 Racial distinctions are made and sponsored by 
government in bidding on government contracts,36 and likewise 
even in the determination of one's eligibility for public housing.37 
The new" depersonalized" racial discrimination (including the kind 
now called affirmative action), just like the old, always has the same 
(de)vice-it demands (or simply imputes) a person's "race." And it 
does so, unmistakably, in order to make each person's place or civil 
rights expressly contingent in whole or in part in keeping with that 
assignment, neither more nor less. 
To be sure, of course these proliferating regimes of racial sorting 
(and of racial stereotyping- so to determine what shall be done 
31. For cases, citations, and a critical review, see R. Richard Banlts, Color of 
Desire: FulfiliingAdopti'OeParents'RacialPreferences Through Discriminatory State 
Action, 107 Yale L.J. 875 (1998). 
32. See Lo'Oingv. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 
198 P.2d 17 (1948); Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883). 
33. See PasadenaBd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976); Brown v. Bd. 
of Educ. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
34. See Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); 
Texas v. Hopwood, 78 F.3rd 932, cm. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996). 
35. See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 433 U.S. 193 (1979). 
36. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); City of 
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 
U.S. 448 (1980) . 
37. See Otero v. New York State Hous. Auth., 484 F .2d 1122 {2d Cir. 1973}. 
2000] AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS 1547 
with one), just like the old, are given a justification by those who 
defend their ramparts and their aggressive use (indeed they are 
usually given more than one, a matter that itself should give one 
reason for pause), even as the uses themselves may shift from time 
to time, and even as do the classifications on which they are built. 
But then, there is assuredly no surprise in any of this, that 
"compelling" reasons are thus proposed, for it has always been so 
when government has proceeded by race: however and whenever 
racial classifications have been deployed under law, in every 
country choosing a "race conscious" agenda, including our own, 
compelling reasons of state and of "sound public policy" have never 
been wanting.38 And so it has always been. But one would be 
surprised if it were otherwise, indeed, for neither people nor 
governments commonly engage in practices they think will do no 
one any real good-neither themselves (by their own deliberate acts 
of discrimination, as sources of continuing empowerment) nor 
those whom they invite by race to be benefitted or preferred. 
Accordingly, of course the government calls its race-based 
queues, race-based pluses (and minuses) and assignments by race 
"affirmative action," and it seeks to have 'us adopt its preferred 
locution (it could hardly call them something else and yet not lose 
the game). And so we find ourselves, each of us and all of us, once 
again called upon to inscribe ourselves in some racial format, to be 
indexed according to (shifting and variable) racial categories, to use 
each other by race. These programs prescribe racial queues, 
establish racial set-asides, and set "guidelines" by race. They go 
further, even to offer tax-funded bonuses paid from public money 
to those who will undertake personal acts of racial discrimination,39 
38. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 343 (1974) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting) ("If discrimination based on race is permissible when those who hold 
the reins of power come up with 'compelling' reasons to justify it, then 
constitutional guarantees acquire an accordionlike [sic] quality."). 
39. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (contractor 
who will reject the lowest subcontract bid solely because of the subcontractor's 
race, as the government desires, in order that the contractor accept a higher-
priced bid submitted by another to whom the government wants the subcontract 
to be awarded by race, will receive a reimbursement even greater than the 
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positively encouraging us by outright paying us to engage in acts of 
racial discrimination even now-even at the hinge of this millennial 
century. 
Yet, however pleasing this is to some, even as we lurch and jar 
in this ubiquitously "race- captured" way, there is a strange measure 
of Orwellian irony. For under our principal civil rights act, matters 
ought to be quite different. On its very face-exactly as we noticed 
as was true of the original Executive Order applicable to federal 
contractors-the principal section in Title vn of the Civil Rights 
Act as enacted in 1964 itself disallows racial discrimination, 
including the kinds the government currently encourages. It thus 
expressly provided (and indeed still does provide~ that it is "an 
unlawful employment practice" for an employer-
to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or 
otherwise to discriminate against any individual ... because 
of [i.e., on the basis oj] such individual's race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin. 
And, to be sure, in keeping with that provision, the Supreme Court 
first treated the guarantee according to its own words, expressly 
declaring (quite in keeping with the statements of the act's own 
principal sponsors in Congress41) that it was straightforwardly an 
difference between the two bids. Id. at 209. It is thus made "profitable" to 
practice racial discrimination in one's business, by government bribe, assuming 
of course it is racial discrimination of a kind the government thus wants to 
encourage and thinks appropriate to foster in just this way.). (fhe most recent 
rationale for a modified form of this practice is roughly as follows. At step one, 
one attempts to determine the extent (if any) to which private contractors may 
have themselves engaged in racial discrimination. At step two, one offers 
government payoffs to induce private contractors (whether or not the ones 
previously engaging in any racial discrimination) to discriminate in reverse 
and! or the government itself equivalendy discriminates in reverse, thesum of the 
acts of racial discrimination balancing out, as it were, though of course in no 
individual way. See id. See also Ian Ayres and Fredrick Vars, When Does Private 
Discrimination Justify Affirmative Action?, 98 COLUM.L REv. 1577 (1998).) 
40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(a)(1). 
41. See Bernard Meltzer, The Weber Case: The Judicial Abrogation of the 
Antidiscrimination Standard in Employment, 47U. CHI. L. REY. 423 (1980); PAUL 
ROBERTS AND LAWRENCE STRA'ITON, THE NEW COLOR LINE 74-77 (1995); 
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anti-discrimination act.42 
Similarly, on its face, too, Title VI of the same 1964 act 
identically forbade (and still forbids) racial discrimination against 
anyone in just the same way. So, it provided an equally unequivocal 
assurance that-
No person .•. shall, on the ground of race, color, or 
national origin, be excluded from participation in any 
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.43 
Four of the nine Justices in Bakke# took Title VI to mean 
exactly what it says; they held that the university's use of race that 
resulted in excluding Allan Bakke for race was forbidden by Title 
VI, even as the Supreme Court of California had itself understood 
to be the case.45 As Justice Stevens put the matter: "In unmistakable 
terms the Act prohibits the exclusion of individuals from federally 
funded programs because of their race. As succinctly phrased during 
the Senate debate, under Title VI it is not 'permissible to say "yes," 
to one person; but to say "no" to another person, only because of 
the color of his skin. ,,,46 
But the views of those four Justices notwithstanding, this 
provision, too, was also fated to be given quite a different (i.e., 
"newspeak") interpretation. So today, the face of the statute 
notwithstanding, a person may be excluded, and may be excluded 
on purely racial grounds, unmistakably, if per chance too many of 
his or of her race are already on hand vis-aMvis others (i.e., of other 
CARL COHEN, NAKED RACIAL PREFERENCE 116-136 (1995); Francis Vaas, Title 
VII: Legislative History, 7 BOSTON COLLEGE !NDUS. & COM. 1. REv. 431(1966). 
42. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) 
("[dJiscriminatory preference for any group, minority or majority, is precisely 
and only what Congress has proscribed.'" Id. at 431 (emphasis added). For 
confirmation, see also JOHN D. SKRENTNY, THE IRoNIES OF AFFlRMATIVE 
ACTION 3, 120-121 (1996); Report to the Attorney General, Redefming 
Discrimination: Disparate Impact and the Institutionalization of AfflI'lllative 
Action 42-46, Dept. of Justice, Office of Legal Policy (Nov. 1987). 
43. 42 U.S.C. § 20oo(d) (emphasis added). 
44. Regents ofUniv. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
45. See id. at 412-421. 
46.Id. at 418 (quoting 110 CONGo REc. 6047 (1964». 
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races).47 
Yet, to take just one kind of such a case (specifically, a case to be 
rationalized by the explanation of seeking, say, "diversity" or 
"representation" -though of course assuredly not the kind of case 
the government probably has in mind4~, if even a Larry Bird had 
47. Thus a mere public institutional preference for a different racial mix than 
can be secured without racial discrimination may provide a basis for such racial 
exclusion austice Powell's once-offered "diversity" view, privileging public 
universities to adjust one's chances for admission downward by race so long as 
other kinds of adjustments are included and not merely race), or the simple 
insistence that others are of a more deserving race austice Brennan's and Justice 
Marshall's view) make it acceptable, consistent with Title VI, to use one's race 
to disprefer them "all things considered" as one may (or may not) be advised 
when turned away. See Bakke. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). ("Diversity"and "doing 
justice" are today's most favored explanations for racial discrimination in our 
public institutions such as they have become, in patronizing students as they 
now do.) 
48. The usual "diversity" arguments seek refuge for racial labeling practices 
and policies of universities than of professional sports. In that setting, ironically, 
they rest even more heavily on stereotype assumptions of meaningful differences 
by race. For just such an example, see, e.g., Arnold Loewy, Taking Bakke 
Seriously: Distinguishing Diversity from Affirmative Action in the Law School 
Admissions Process, 77 N.C. L. REv. 1479, 1492, 1494 (1999).) See also RONALD 
DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE 404 (2000). (Cj. George Sher, Diversity, 28 PHIL. 
ANDPUB.AFF. 85 (1999); Randall Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 
102HAR.v. L. REv. 1745, 1801~1807 (1989). (professor Loewy suggests that where 
most of the students already enrolled in a given class are other than "black," the 
state university may determine within the remaining group of applicants for 
admission-rightly in his own view-that "[a] student with a3.1 average and a 152 
LSAT score may be better qualified (sic) than a[nother] student with a 3.4 average 
and a 157 LSA T score, either became the lesser-numbered student has traveled 
around the world [as few of the other students may have done] or because he is 
black." (See also id. at 1492, suggesting that the selection of "the lesser~numbered" 
("black") student ;umpedover other applicants on racial grounds. when there are 
few of his or her race currently enrolled, should meet with no objections from 
them-because he is better qualified [in being "black"] in much the same way as 
when :m NFL team needs a placekicker it currently lacks, i.e., what is needed is 
one vital to the overall team's success and better than others (who are not so 
good in placekicking) in a particular role. ("Being black" is the equivalent role.) 
But what is going on here? (Is it not this, as Louis Lusky observed more than 
three decades ago: "The stereotype still holds us in thrall.") {Louis Lusky, The 
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been selected over another to play for the Boston Celtics, the better 
to integrate the team (to provide some" better racial balance" were 
it, without him, overall too lacking in suitable diversity), he would 
then also have been merely one more beneficiary of racial 
discrimination, and obviously so. Moreover, that Larry Bird would 
have been its beneficiary rather than its victim, and that he was a 
most skillful athlete, does not mean that there was no racial 
discrimination, and no "real" or measurable harm to anyone else by 
race or any loss. There was, or would have been if this had been the 
case, to whatever extent and in whatever way "race" would have 
been attributed to Bird and then utilized to determine his selection 
Stereotype: Hard Core of Racism, 13 BUFFALO L. REv. 450 (1964).) 
By mere parity of reasoning, Professor Loewy must (as I believe he does) 
likewise conclude that, quite equivalently, a "'white' student with a 3.1 average 
and a 152 score" is likewise "better qualified" than "a 'black' student with a 3.4 
average and a 157 LSAT score," where both apply for admission to a state law 
school which happens to have enrolled few, if any, other "whites." But I think 
few would straight-facedly presume to say that this "lesser-numbered"(sic) 
"white" student was in fact better qualified than •.. whom? The displaced black 
applicant? Really? Who would dare so to say. 
Compare, with Professor Loewy's view, the different suggestion by Justice 
Douglas (De Funis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 343 (1974) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting): ("A segregated admissions process [i.e., a process applying racial 
nonuniform standards for admission of the kind reflected in Professor Lowey's 
examples and in the De Funis case itself] creates suggestions of stigma and caste 
no less than a segregated classroom, and in the end it may produce that result 
despite its contrary intentions.") See also JOIiNH. MCWHORTER, LOSING THE 
RACE: SELF-SABOTAGE IN BLACK AMERICA (2000); STEPHEN CARTER, 
REFLEcnONSOF ANAFFIRMATIVEAcnONBABY 56 (1991) ("That gushing [i.e., 
"that gushing" of other students, referring to the praise one receives but cannot 
trust] is part of the peculiar relationship between black intellectuals and the 
white ones who seem loathe to criticize us for fear of being branded 
racists-which is itself a mark of racism of a sort"). N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 20, 1999, at 
A35 (reporting on confirming stereotype role of specially recruited students by 
race) "[M]any minority students say they find themselves . . . sought out 
unnaturally for trophy friendships, and constantly the subject of speculation 
over whether they are qualified or are taking the spot of someone more 
deserving."); THOMAS SOWEll, PREFERENTIALPOUCIES: ANlNTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE (1990); THOMAS SOWELL, BLACK EDUCATION: MYTIIS AND 
TRAGEDIES (1972). 
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in preference to another player identified by that other player's 
different racial label and passed over on that account. Nor 0 f 
course (to consider another kind of "justification" that some now 
vigorously press4~ that most or even all of the particular audiences 
before whom Bird (and the Celtics) may have played may well have 
contained an even larger fraction of ticket-buying patrons "of his 
race," than he, by his presence, may (in this scenario) have provided 
on the team, is surely neither here nor there in affecting our 
thoughts. It would not deny or diminish the fact of racial 
discrimination in the stipulated circumstances, nor excuse it in any 
degree. Nor would it lessen the obvious harm involved to another, 
the rejection-their race-based demotion-of whoever it was who 
sought no more than to be considered without "minus points" 
because of his race, but, once given those minus points, was left out. 
So, whatever success Bird had, however his play contributed to 
the satisfaction of Celtic management, or the enhanced joy of the 
watching crowds of fans, it would not alter the fact and real stain 
of racial discrimination stipulated in his selection, if this were the 
way it occurred. But so it is, however it is done, in all these 
arrangements, as we should all be able to understand and to see. 
Underneath all the explanations, defensive, aggressive, angry, 
indignant and otherwise, moreover, I suspect we do. 
IV. 
Many decades ago, reflecting his agreement with Justice 
Harlan's own position in an earlier time,SO and anticipating Justice 
49. (See discussion supra, note 17, of effortS by the NAACP to induce racial 
discrimination in employment practices in proportion to racial patronage, 
evidently thinking it entirely appropriate to expect a matching along these lines.) 
50. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 555 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) 
("[Our] destinies ..• in this country, are indissolubly linked together, and the 
interests of [all] require that the common government of all shall not permit the 
seeds of race hate to be planted under the sanction of law. The sure guarantee of 
the peace and security of each race is the clear, distinct, unconditional 
recognition by our governments, National and State, of every right that inheres 
in civil freedom, and of the equality before the law of all citizens of the United 
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Douglas' view as welI,51 Justice Murphy of the Supreme Court had 
put the essential matter we have been considering still one more 
time in just the following way: 
Racial discrimination in any form and iD. any degree has no 
justifiable part whatever in our democratic way of life. It is 
unattractive in any setting but it is utterly revolting among 
a free people who have embraced the principles set forth in 
the Constitution of the United States.52 
States without regard to race.") 
51. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 337, 343-344 (1974) (Douglas,J., 
dissenting) (emphasis added) ("A [person] who is white is entitled to no 
advantage by reason of that fact; nor is he subject to any disability, no matter 
what his race or color. So far as race is concerned, any state-sponsored preference 
of one race over another ... is in my view 'invidious' and violative of the Equal 
Protection Clause.") 
52. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 242 (1944) (Murphy, J., 
dissenting). See also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena 515 U.S. 200, 240 (1995) 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (,,[U]nder the Constitution, the government may not 
make distinctions on the basis of race •.• Purchased at the price of immeasurable 
human suffering, the equal protection principle reflects our Nation's 
understanding that such classifications ultimately have a destructive impact on 
the individual and our society.") 
Justice Thomas' views have been particularly scorned, to be sure. It is 
evidently forgotten (or perhaps not forgotten) by some of those most inclined to 
do so, however, that it isJustice Thomas and not they, who now scorn him, who 
faithfully echoes what those who litigated Brown v. Board of Education, 347 
U.S. 483 (1954) urged before the Supreme Court nearly half-a-century ago. See, 
e.g., opening argument of Robert L. Carter in Brown as referenced in Phillip 
Kurland & Gerhardt Casper (eds.), 49 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF 
THE SUPREME COURT 278 (1975) (emphasis added) ("We have one fundamental 
contention which we will seek to develop in the course of this argument, and 
that contention is that no state has any authority under the equal protection 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to use race as a factor in affording 
educational opportunities among its citizens.") Id. at 287. 
See also the oral argument where Carter argued to the Court, that it was not 
bound by its own prior decision in Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 {1927}, 
precisely because, he observed, in Gong Lum, the petitioner did not take this 
position {rather, as Carter quite rightly said, the petitioner in that case "did not 
at all contest the state's power to enforce a racial classification" but had merely 
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And still we-or many of us-seem not to believe it, for the agencies 
of government (including even the Congress of the United States) 
continue to use, and to encourage, varieties of racial discrimination, 
racial allocative devices and rationales. Still, it may not be helpful 
to pile up more mounds of examples.53 Rather, it is more than time 
to bring this brief review to some kind of repose. Briefly, then, to 
summarize where we are and where we have been. 
Among the forms of affirmative actions we have reviewed, one 
is pro-active in what it commits us to do, namely, to take active 
measures to ensure to each person that they will not-will never-be 
treated less well than others because of their (imputed) "race,» even 
as the original Executive Orders applicable to federal contractors 
imposed a duty on each of them so to conduct themselves. Of two 
challenged how it was used), whereas here, in Brown, Carter declared, petitioner 
does contest that power. Indeed, as he has already observed, it is the point of this 
litigation to persuade the Court that the Fourteenth Amendment strips any such 
claim of power from every state. 1d. at 287. The proposition is exactly what 
Justice Thomas accepts, agrees with, and adopts as his own, in his well and 
strongly stated view supra. 
53. But see how (even) a state commissioner of prisons, acting pursuant to 
encouragement by the Federal Law Enforcement Assistance Agency, presumed 
to install his own program of racial discrimination in deciding who, in what 
(racial) order, was to be promoted and not promoted, within the prison staff 
subject to his authority. (promotions of prison employees were to be determined 
by race, to adjust the racial composition of the prison workforce more nearly to 
match the racial composition of the prison inmate population within the prisons 
where they worked.) Minnick v. Cal. Dep't of Corrections, 95 Cal. App.3d 506 
(1979), cert. dismissed, 452 U.S. 105 (1981). {But see the dissenting opinion by 
Justice Stewart (452 U.S. at 128) (emphasis added) voting to review this case and 
reverse outright because, in his view, the state court had "wrongly held that the 
State may consider a person's race in making promotion decisions." He went on 
to declare his position, quite as unequivocally as had Justice Douglas likewise 
declared his own in the De Funis case, in just the following way: "So far as the 
Constitution goes, a private person may engage in any racial discrimination he 
wants, d. Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, but under the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment a sovereign State may never do so. And 
it is wholly irrelevant whether the State gives a <plus' or <minus' value to a person's 
race, whether the discrimination occurs in a decision to hire or fire or promote, or 
whether the discrimination is called 'affirmative action' or by some less euphemistic 
term.") 
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more extended forms of affIrmative action, one of these-the 
first-is that which seeks to secure a periodic and conscious review 
and revision of such practices and policies as may, in fact, 
contribute marginally (if at all) to the mission or productivity of a 
given enterprise, educational or otherwise, even while adversely 
shutting out signifIcant numbers from consideration, as there is no 
fair need so to do. To the extent that modifications in institutional 
practice can extend access and opportunity to previously ineligible 
persons, these modiftcations have always been worth encouraging 
(indeed, they came to be expected pursuant to Title Vll), even as it 
may be additionally appropriate to consider the subsidy of such 
programs as may be helpful to that end. And there is still another 
form of acting affirmatively toward our fellow citizens (now 
seriously neglected). It is to be conscientious of all who have less 
than ourselves, all who tend to be left out, electing domestic 
priorities to put a renewed emphasis upon those programs and 
constructive forms of assistance to raise the real opportunities of 
disadvantaged people so to have a fairer chance to have productive 
lives as equal citizens. This, too, is affirmative action, among the 
best kinds, the more so because it puts no boundaries on 
compassion for the poor or out-of-work by race, and seeks no mere 
divisions of a "zero sum" game by race. 
And beyond these measures? Beyond these measures, almost 
certainly the better role government can aspire to is to set a more 
admirable example than it has, to be a better example for others to 
follow,54 and never seek to encourage, much less to require or to 
subsidize, acts of racial discrimination in . our public life.55 
Moreover, whatever the government may do, and whether it 
continues its current practices or can be made to give them up, for 
54.SeeOlmsteadv. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (Brandeis,J.,dissenting) 
("Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher."). 
55. The power also resides in Congress to forbid any agency of government, 
at any level whatever, including state and local government, from utilizing any 
person's race for purposes of qualifying or of determining any right, privilege, 
or obligation under law. Indeed, it is not suitable constitutional power to take 
just this kind of affirmative action that is wanting, rather, it is merely the will. 
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all who desire always to act affirmatively, the principle is clear, and 
the answer is where it has always been, in the personal affirmation 
of our common humanity: that each is yet a whole person whom 
it is improper to count or to discount by race, to grade or degrade 
by race, to sort through or presume to assign to some "appropriate" 
racial queue. Affirmative people, I think, do not welcome either of 
these systems as such or the suppositions or modus operandi with 
which these systems operate, to shuffle, to arrange, and so to 
dispense ... by race. Moreover, in not welcoming them, I do not 
think that such people forget history, as some writers presume to 
say they do. Rather, I believe quite the opposite-it is they who 
remember history very well. It is, moreover, in remembering 
history that they have learned from it one of the more profound 
lessons that life can teach. 
Appendix and Epilogue 
In countries where people of more than a single "race" or 
"ethnic group" find themselves seriously vexed with one another, 
race conscious solutions are commonplace. Things generally sort 
themselves out in one or more of the following seven ways that are 
"race conscious" -the ways that "make race count." 
I. Subordination By Race. Among the most common means of 
making race count, historically and in several nations today, is 
simple subordination by race-establishing racial hierarchies of 
position and place, of the racially superordinate and subordinate, 
superior and inferior, higher and lower. Racial identity is assigned,56 
rules of deference are fitted into place, fixed by law and by 
custom-of who yields to whom, of rank and racial position. 
Clarity and certainty are thus sought to be furnished in these 
regimes of "to each according to race," hierarchically arranged, and 
strictly enforced. 
Institutionalized race slavery-a most common practice 
56. -A feature of all the items in this taxonomic list save the last .... 
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historically (and far from unknown even now)-fits solidly within 
this model. Strict caste systems assuredly do so as well. Prominent 
de jure and de facto regimes and practices of institutionalized racial 
subordination obviously extend through far greater refinements 
than these, however, without losing the essential characteristic the 
model itself provides. 
Often employed (indeed, in one form or another, subordination 
by race is probably still the single most commonplace manner to 
"make race count" worldwide), this modus vivendi of taking race 
into account yet requires constant vigilance against the smoldering 
resentment likely to be felt by those difficult to convince of the 
justice of their subordination. Eventually, on that account, it may 
simply give way to some more "perfect" resolution profiled in this 
list: other ways of making race count. 
II. Elimination By Race. A still widely employed response to 
internal racial ennui and racial angst within a given society, this 
kind of race-conscious action seeks to bring racial frictions and 
anxieties of racial differences within a country or nation to a 
suitable end, foreclosing further friction, by "having it out." It is, 
to paraphrase Hamlet, to act to take arms against a sea of troubles, 
as it were, and by opposing those troubles, bring them finally to an 
end. 
Vexations of racial difference and conflict end by identifying 
and by killing every member of an identified race-systematically 
ferreting them all out, extinguishing all of them, leaving none to be 
noticed, to grieve or to seek revenge, or to be visible as a remnant 
or reminder of what they might be like .. or once were. Its object is 
extinction. It means to provide-or restore-homogeneity of race. 
Its reasoning is both very cool and intensely hot. It is a solution 
seeking to be a "final solution~" such as this manner of solution 
seeks for itself. If we forbear from dwelling upon it more at length, 
it is not from supposing that it has passed from the scene. Assuredly 
it has not. 
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III. Expulsiion/Exclusiolll By Race. Something less grisly and grim 
is the ambition of those who use race in this way. All that is sought 
here is relief from racial differences by ending those differences, not 
by mass killings, but mere transportation as it were. This mode of 
affirmative action is even now a fairly common technique of 
resolving racial tension, as we well know. Indeed, we have 
frequently seen it in various states in different parts of our world, 
most recently in the Balkans as we watched within the past year or 
so. It is merely a question of who (by race) stays, and who (by race) 
goes. Its object is otherwise identical to that in the previous model. 
It puts an end to racial differences, as it were, by putting an end to 
different races within the state. 
IV. Separation By Race. The object here is indistinguishable from 
the object in the two preceding models, that is, still again to end the 
vexations of racial difference simply by eliminating all domestic 
differences of race. But the means to that end are different, and 
seemingly much more benign. They are characterized by a principle 
of "equal treatment and equal respect" by race-neither to 
exterminate norto expel (thus "cleansing" the nation), but rather to 
divide and go one's own way. 
The idea is to seek some final division first by moving interior 
populations around to provide more perfect racial homogeneity by 
geography, and then by peacefully separating into new separate 
sovereignties, each complete in itself. New boundaries will be 
drawn such that essentially each race may then be exclusive, 
separate, and secure within its own boundaries, the division to take 
place on this seemingly respectful principle: "To each their own, 
according to race." Here, the principle as applied simply means: 
"To each, by race, their own national state." 
v. Federation By Race. Here, racial homogeneity merely within 
different states constitutive of the larger intact national state is the 
way of accommodation, rather than dissolution and separation in 
the large sense of breaking up a nation into two or more separate 
sovereign nations or states. Thus, as one example of "federation by 
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race," a national state may itself be subdivided along carefully 
drawn lines, the better to perfect a number of racially distinctive, 
race-based states within a single country or nation, each with a 
significant degree of local power albeit preserving still a national 
legislature,57 to which race-based constituencies, acting through 
elections within racially-homogeneous states or other race-based 
political subdivisions (such as they may be) direct "their" 
representatives (i.e., the representatives of "their" race). A s a 
lesser-included variation, using still the same model, even smaller 
political subdivisions such as a county or a town, or even a mere 
congressional district, may be deliberately gerrymandered by race 
(so to assure the almost certain election of representatives 
themselves of a particular "race"). It is a familiar model, indeed, not 
unknown, even encouraged, in the United States.58 
VI. Segregation By Race. Resolving racial differences by 
segregation, as distinct from separation along more sharply defined 
demarcations, embraces a vast range of devices, from some 
seemingly very minor, to others more substantial, and, according 
to one's taste, to still others multiplied and extended until they may 
reach an exceedingly grand scale. As a strategy of coping with (i.e., 
"reconciling") racial differences, moreover, these arrangements are 
so numerous and so varied that perhaps a single standard model is 
awkward to describe.59 
Still, however these accommodations may vary in scope or 
57. With limited legislative jurisdiction on matters affecting the nation as a 
whole, (e.g., national defense, foreign relations, a common currency, passage and 
unencumbered free trade among the states). 
58. The obvious reference here is to the various efforts to carve voting 
districts by race. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno 509 U.S. 630 (1993). See also the 
discussion infra, next section ("Segregation"). 
59. Indeed, the immediate preceding model (of racially-organized subparts 
of a federation, or racially-organized subparts of a city or of a state) is itself but 
an example, of large scale segregation by race. Perhaps it would be suitable to 
describe such arrangements-large scale segregation-as "grand apartheid" while 
what is here to be considered is apartheid on somewhat lesser scales-"petty 
apartheid" in varying degrees. 
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extent, they all exhibit a common technique. From the most trivial 
(e.g., mere provision for racially separate restrooms, assuring to 
each a place, a sense of personal security and privacy of mere toilet 
by race) to the most substantial (e.g., the redirection of people by 
race into racially-homogeneous political subdivisions), the basic idea 
even here is much the same as in the two preceding models, inside 
a continuing, ongoing society or state. The model and its guiding 
principle remains pretty much the same as noticed in every case so 
far reviewed: "To each race its own."60 
Then, if one inquires more concretely ("to each race its own 
what?"), the answer that is forthcoming is to paraphrase Bob Dole. 
The answer to the question is ..• "whatever." Or, more concretely, 
"just whatever seems best." The model does not demand any 
particular answer. It leaves such details to the affected parties 
themselves to decide. 
"To each race its own" may be merely separate sections of buses 
(for example, the back or the front of the bus, or the left or right 
side of the bus), or even whole buses, separately identified, even as 
they may also be separate schools, set aside theaters, or whole 
towns or-even as exhibited in an earlier model-whole states. In 
brief, it is whatever racial planners finds mutual solace in so 
arranging matters, i.e., whatever racial enthusiasts believe it ought 
appropriately to include. 
So, to offer still another example, "to each race its own" may 
mean, "its own neighborhood."61 Or it may (though it need not) 
extend also to "its own schools."62 Or, indeed, along a different 
60. -Or (the same thing) "to each its own according to race." 
61. -That is, an ethnically (racially) comfortable, congenial and familiar 
neighborhood, free of racial tensions because peopled with one's "own" 
reassuring neighbors such as they are (each easy to recognize racially, no 
discernible racial difference from oneself). 
62. -All the better, one would say (and some do so say), to insure one's 
"own" curriculum, one's own teachers, books, and common school culture, each 
thus most suitably "responsive" to one's own needs, and also to one's own 
interests according to the constant principle of "to each its own according to 
race". 
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dimension it may extend also to "its own representatives" as well.63 
And so it-this principle (one can fairly call it a "principle" such as 
it is, "to each race its own") may take hold and proceed even in an 
ever-widening gyre of things to be included in its embrace. Where 
it stops (we have already noticed it may quite coherently embrace 
even the idea of "to each race its own state" or "its own municipal 
or congressional voting district by race") the model per se does not 
presume to decide. Local or national circumstances may simply 
decide such matters, such as those circumstances are. 
Still, whatever the degree and kind of such encouraged-or even 
required-segregation, and at whatever level it is maneuvered into 
place, it will but capture, report, and reflect just one more time the 
"race consciousness" of those thus strongly inclined to appease it in 
just this way. By the same gesture, its enactment will also reflect the 
commensurate degree of racial discomfort, of racial mistrust, of 
apprehension, and of anxiety that is thus sought to be relieved by 
the extent and extensiveness of this race-based modus vivendi under 
the general rubric: To each their own according to race. 
To be sure, complaint is often made of these arrangements, that 
regimes conducted in the image of this model, have fallen short. 
They have "cheated," in that things were indeed separate, yet not 
equal. In respect to many such regimes, that is, it will be fairly 
declared of them that they were corrupted as but regimes of 
"separate and unequal" by race.64 If so, let it be admitted, however, 
63. I.e., very much as in the "federation" model of using race previously 
examined, as in drawing racially-based (thus deliberately racially-segregated) 
voting districts, so to maximize racial homogeneity within each: that "each race" 
may be better assured of "its" representation [x.e., representation "according to 
race.") And so, indeed even now, whole cities and counties, and whole states 
(some on their own initiative, others under a degree of federal duress), still see 
hope in segregation-in the principle of to each its own by race-as a sound 
means to "reconcile" felt racial differences. Here, the principle struggles to be 
born again, to live again, thus to fence by race, to separate, and to concentrate 
voters "according to race." The government is assembled on the bedrock of racial 
segregation of voters, to representatives elected on the enduring segregationist 
bedrock principle of "to each race its own." 
64. Actually, then, in any such circumstance, however, this is but a variation 
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it is not a fault intrinsic to the model. The model need not yield to 
that complaint per se. All that needs to be done, one may suggest, 
to avoid the sting of such criticism, is to act with a more equitable 
and appropriate resolve, the better to insure the fuller integrity and 
more genuine equality of things-things nonetheless respectively to 
be apportioned consistent with this "principle" - To each race its 
own and to each its own according to race. 
VII. "Rights by Race" in The "Integrated" State. There are many 
in fact who continue to see in this last model we have just reviewed, 
a compelling degree of political allure. In fact they energetically 
pursue mere variations of the model even now, racially planning, 
racially arranging, still in keeping with the notion-to each its own 
share according to race. To be sure, they would resist the 
description of what they support as having anything in common 
with what we have just reviewed ("segregation"), but they use its 
principle of racial segregation nonetheless in point of fact, and they 
aggressively employ its taxonomy and its very means. 
-So, they do, for example, in segregating job applicants (by 
race), and in segregating test scores by race, even as they do in 
segregating government contract bids by race, and whatever else 
seems appropriate thus to segregate by race and then to dispense. 
"Arranging" personal rights by race (the model we now examine 
briefly), paradoxically itself draws on the principle that is 
steadfastly racialist (and indeed racially segregationalist) in its 
essential technique. And, as in every previous instance we have 
briefly reviewed, it proceeds still according to some variant of this 
principle: "To each-in whole or in part-according to race." 
So, to illustrate the point, consider the designated racial 
gatekeeper employed in a particular public institution, say, perhaps 
as an admissions officer at the plant or school. He or she will follow 
this practice: "Here's an application from a student.65 This file bears 
of the first category, of racial hierarchies arranged by law, i.e., of "subordination" 
according to race. 
65. (-Or in a different setting, merely with a different government racial 
gatekeeper, a me from a contractor, a teacher, a bricklayer, or athlete seeking a 
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the name of 'Tiger Woods.' Here's another, this one from a 'John 
Morales.' Here's another, from a Ms. 'Lucia Lee'. And other files, 
and more files still: 'Leon Cao,' 'Shirley Huang,' 'M.L. Thurman,' 
'P G' " eter rey ..... 
Next, in tum, the question becomes (for the gatekeeper): 
"W'here am I to direct this file of this person, this 'Tiger Woods?' 
Perhaps into the bin over here, the bin for persons labeled 'mixed'? 
And in turn, where shall I likewise direct this other file, of this 
'Leon Cao' (he sounds Vietnamese-do we have a category for 
'Vietnamese' or just this larger one, of 'Asians'? ... did we think 
the 'Chinese' are indistinguishable, or distinguishable, from the 
'Japanese'?). And this fellow, 'M.L. Thurman,' what race is 
he ..... " And so forth, routinely, by file, by racial category, by 
racial and ethnic bin. 
So, adhering as we are wont to do, to sort things out among 
some prescribed racial categories, we sort this out just so: make the 
judgment, check the file-against the possibility of mistake; then 
place each where it properly belongs, segregated and stacked, 
among the rising piles of larger and of smaller stacks, perhaps even 
literally (if not literally then still functionally, say, with telltale 
identifying "pluses" and "minuses," or however the coding is 
racially graphed). 
Next, we take from the top of each whatever number is 
required such that, when mixed with the like-selected files from the 
other respective stacks, a desirable distribution of "rights by race" 
within the unit formed in just this manner is now assured. Shuffling 
back-and-forth among racial stacks in some predetermined 
proportion, we get a fair reflection of "to each according to race." 
The principle writ large, in all we do? It is the state's own racial 
adaptation from what one has seen at Baskins & Robbins. Its 
principle is this: "Take a ticket from the machine appropriate to your 
race, and wait until you are called." 
And so it goes from day to day. In every instance, as we stand 
in line and wait our tum, of course, there is a fine racial screening, 
tryout). 
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and a certain degree of squeezing of a person into some coarse racial 
niche, fitting them to the grid, tucking and trimming the edges, 
even as in some procrustean fable, to slip each into some defined 
box: racial counting, sorting, of mine and thine, layer on layer of 
the race-attributing, race-counting, incorrigible state. But so we 
conclude this brief serial review, of the various ways-the roughly 
seven ways racially angst-ridden societies plan, decide, and act. 
They are all different, yet all the same: forever and always, they 
make race count, they use each of us by race. 
Across a divide, in another place, there exists a single different 
constitutional model. It has nothing in common with these seven 
ways. It measures no one by racial categories, and no one by racial 
lists, or indexes, boxes, labels, quotas, shares, entitlements, and 
racial queues. Here, indeed, race is the measure of nothing dispensed 
by its laws nor does anyone desire that it ever should be. And 
however things once were otherwise, or however they may be still 
be elsewhere, there is a common resolve that they are never to be 
that way again. Here, as a consequence, there are no places where 
one will go that are characterized by an array of machines near the 
entrance, whether figurative or literal, fronted by the following 
sign: "Take a ticket from the machine appropriate to your race, and 
wait until called ... " The machines, such as might once have been 
there, have all been removed. They are gone, one and all, discarded, 
dropped in a landfill. And none save some neo-racialists miss them 
in the least.66 
66. But how, one may ask did this happen? (How, indeed, than by 
affirmative action-it was an affirmative action that swept them all away.) 
